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 1. INTRODUCTION
 The objective of the study is to analyze the internal and external factors that influence
 the size and composition of boards of directors. The basic premise is that each com-
 pany has different needs for advice and control by the board, and that those needs are
 determined by the complexity of the company and the availability of alternative control
 mechanisms respectively. Taking into account those needs, firms choose their board size
 and composition. On the basis of this idea, two hypotheses, a complexity hypothesis and a
 monitoring hypothesis, are tested on a sample of 171 Spanish firms trading on the Stock
 Exchange during the 2004-2008 period.
 The paper deals with the study of an interesting and topical area, determinants of boards
 of directors' size and composition. During the past decades, few issues have received
 as much attention as corporate governance and boards of directors. However, far more
 research is needed because we still know little about how boards actually work and
 how they are structured. The topic of corporate governance is of special relevance both
 in professional and academic settings, due to the wave of financial scandals which has
 shaken international markets. Inadequate corporate governance structures and, in par-
 ticular, poor supervision by boards of directors have been singled out as the root cause of
 these corporate scandals (Dalton and Dalton, 2005). During recent years, the progressive
 concern for finding working corporate models has led to a large body of research to find
 recommendations for an optimal operational code for boards of directors, which governs
 the principles of listed companies, which is both transparent and efficient in its reporting
 to investors and shareholders in order to regain their confidence. Although the starting
 point of those recommendations is very heterogeneous in terms of the legal and insti-
 tutional environment in each country, a common theme is an agency theory approach
 which seeks to strength the monitoring board role. There are common advices advocat-
 ing smaller and more independent boards in the belief that they monitor better.
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 40 ARTÍCULOS DOCTRINALES
 The emphasis of these codes on the monitoring function of boards is aligned with the
 focus of agency theory in much of the literature on boards of directors. During more
 than two decades agency theory has been the dominant theory in studies about boards
 of directors. However, related empirical evidence is inconclusive and there is limited
 guidance for policymakers seeking to identify governance practices that result in more
 effective firm performance (Finegold, Hecht and Benson, 2007). Many companies are
 moving away from previously recommended models of governance and there is consider-
 able heterogeneity in the structures adopted by boards. In this sense, recent research on
 this field points out that no single theory explains the board of directors configuration,
 suggesting the need to apply a multi theoretical approach and to extend the analysis be-
 yond the traditional board role of monitoring, to consider also the advisory one (Hillman
 and Dalziel, 2003). With respect to this last point, we are moving towards a human capi-
 tal and knowledge based economy and many of the underlying assumptions of agency
 theory can be considered empirically wrong when relating to knowledge based activities
 and resources (Huse, Hoskisson, Zattoni and Vigano, 2011). This view was advanced by
 Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), who identified the provision of advice and counsel and the
 exercise of control as two primary components of a board's internal administrative func-
 tion. The paper of Acero and Alcalde is sitting within this trend and complements agency
 theory predictions by using resource dependence theory.
 Following recent research on corporate governance, another important feature is the
 endogenous approach adopted in the study. This approach states that the structure of
 the board of directors is endogenously determined by company characteristics and the
 contractual environment in which it operates (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003) and, there-
 fore, the ideal composition for a board of a particular organization may not be the same
 as for another. That is to say, no single optimal structure will fit all firms. Given its own
 needs for advice and control, each company will choose for its board the structure which
 maximizes its efficiency. This idea implies that, under determined circumstances, larger
 and less independent boards could be better than smaller and more independent boards.
 As Andres and Rodriguez (2009) point out, determining when one particular function,
 the monitoring or the advisory one, proves more important than the other is an impor-
 tant topic for research.
 The context of analysis chosen in this study is also relevant. Theory and research, to a
 large extent, have been shaped by the situations and developments in large U.S. corpo-
 rations. There has been very limited attention given to boards and governance in other
 settings, such as different national contexts in Europe. Consequently, much remains to
 be learned about boards and governance outside the samples of large U.S. corporations.
 The selection of Spain as the context for analysis is of relevance because of the French
 Civil Law origin of its legal system. This means that the corporate governance model is
 characterized by a high ownership concentration, higher than in countries whose legal
 systems had their origins in Common Law , due to the lower protection of shareholders'
 interests in the former (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999). Thus, the Span-
 ish business sector enables authors to analyze board of directors structure in a context
 characterized by high ownership concentration, in contrast to most existing literature,
 which focuses on American and Anglo-Saxon markets framed out within the tradition
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 of Common Law. While in the US the main issue is managers' opportunistic behaviour
 (agency problem owner-manager, Villalonga and Amit, 2006), in continental Europe the
 focus is on the divergence of interests between large and minority shareholders (agency
 problem owner-owner, Villalonga and Amit, 2006). The monitoring role by owners is not
 as important in US as in continental countries, where ownership concentration is higher,
 the level of investor protection is lower and large blockholders have greater power and
 stronger incentives to ensure shareholder value maximization (Sánchez-Ballesta and
 García-Meca, 2007). The institutional context in which the company operates is of spe-
 cial importance when determining the relevance of both main board roles, named the
 supervisory and advisory functions. In this sense, Andres and Rodriguez (2009) suggest
 that in contexts exhibiting a greater convergence between ownership and management,
 the advisory board role could prove more important than the monitoring one.
 The main results of the paper highlight that board composition (measured by the per-
 centage of independent members) and size (measured by the number of board members)
 are established by a rational choice process which considers each firm's specific charac-
 teristics and needs for advice and supervision. Authors conclude that, in the aggregate,
 board size and independence are positively affected by the complexity of the decisions to
 be made and the need to solve possible agency problems. However, the board's two func-
 tions (advisory and control) have different specific weights when explaining each of the
 two characteristics considered (board size and independence). While variations in board
 size basically attend to different advisory requirements, variations in the proportion of
 independent directors are more due to the need for control. These results are interpreted
 by authors as a probe that in the Spanish context independents are basically intended
 to monitor large block holders and protect the interest of minority shareholders rather
 than because of their experience and advisory capacity. However, more directors (larger
 board size) are sitting when the complexity of the firm increases because they are in
 more need for advice.
 In my opinion, both the topic and the theoretical and empirical approaches are relevant
 in the corporate governance field. After these comments on general aspects of the paper,
 some specific issues are exposed which authors could consider in future extensions of
 the present research.
 2. COMMENTS ON THE SAMPLE, METHOD AND MODEL
 The sample is compounded of 753 observations of 171 firms during the 2004-2008 pe-
 riod. Taking into account that the sample is a combination of longitudinal and cross
 sectional data, the econometric approach used to test the hypotheses was panel data,
 which allowed authors to model the unobservable heterogeneity between different com-
 panies. Specifically, authors used Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) estimators,
 which are robust to the presence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. However, this
 methodology does not take into account the problem of endogeneity arising in corporate
 governance researches. To solve this matter, authors run an alternative regression by
 using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). In this regard, authors do not indi-
 cate whether they are using the difference GMM estimator or the system GMM estimator.
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 When comparing them, apart from using a greater number of moment conditions, which
 may be informative, the system estimator allows including in the model time-invariant
 variables, such as those relating to a board with a low temporal variability that would be
 eliminated in the initial model in differences. In addition, Blundell and Bond (1998) show
 that the system estimator provides less biased estimates than the estimator of the model
 in differences in the case of finite samples and in the case that the dependent variable
 is persistent, since in this model instruments appear to be weak (see Bond (2002) for a
 discussion of the issue).
 The short period of analysis could be a limitation of the study: a five-year data period
 does not allow measuring the evolution of corporate boards as firms mature. Authors
 argue that it cannot be enlarged because the obligation for Spanish companies to present
 annual corporate governance reports began in 2004. However, many Spanish firms pre-
 sented their corporate governance reports before that year. Taking into account the ad-
 vantages of an unbalanced panel data, observations before 2004 could be included for
 many firms of the dataset. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged the hard work of au-
 thors when collecting data, because the database of corporate governance variables had
 been made manually, firm by firm and year by year.
 Another important subject with respect to the period of analysis is regarding the dif-
 ferent codes of good governance along that period. In this sense, the Aldama Code and
 the Conthe Code could be influencing the size and independence of boards of directors.
 Corporate governance reports for the 2004-2006 subperiod are under the Aldama Code,
 while reports for 2007 and 2008 are under the Conthe Code. It is possible that the config-
 uration of a board of directors is not following an efficiency criteria but pressure imple-
 mented, for example, by good governance recommendations. In keeping with this idea,
 it could be interesting to analyze the time trend of board size and board independence
 along the 2004-2008 period and to develop a framework based on institutional theory for
 investigating and understanding to what extent boards of directors respond to changes
 in the national pattern of corporate governance (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). In
 this respect, there is anecdotal evidence that boards have undergone substantial chang-
 es due to forces like shareholder activism and technology advancement (Link, Netter and
 Yang, 2008).
 According to two board roles under analysis, authors develop two hypotheses to test.
 On the one hand, the «control hypothesis» states that «as the need for control grows,
 boards become smaller with a larger proportion of independent members». In this re-
 gard, authors consider that needs for control grows when there are no other alternative
 control mechanisms in place. As proxies for control mechanisms other than the board of
 directors, managerial ownership, ownership concentration, level of debt and leadership
 structure are used. On the other hand, the «complexity hypothesis» states that «as the
 need for advice grows,. boards become larger with a larger proportion of independent
 members». Regarding this last proposition, authors consider that needs for advice grows
 when the firm becomes more complex. As proxies for the complexity of the firm, size of
 the firm, degree of diversification and firm age are used. Although both hypotheses have
 been adequately stated and they logically flow from theory discussion, in my view some
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 aspects which may be of particular relevance within a context of high ownership con-
 centration have not been considered. Their consideration could guide authors in future
 extensions of this research.
 Firstly, in the control hypothesis development, authors do not take into account that
 board size reflects a tradeoff between the firm-specific benefits of increased monitoring
 and the costs of such monitoring (Boone, Field, Karpoff and Raheja, 2007). For example,
 Lehn, Patro and Zhao (2009) argue that high-growth firms will have small boards with
 a high proportion of insiders because their costs of monitoring are high. Coles, Daniel
 and Naveen (2008) suggest that the proportion of inside directors will be positively re-
 lated to the firm's RandD expenditures because outside board members are ineffective in
 monitoring firms with high growth potential. Linck et al. (2008) argue that firms facing
 greater information asymmetry will have smaller and less independent boards because
 of the higher costs of monitoring. Raheja (2005) and Harris and Raviv (2008) suggest that
 the net benefits of extra monitoring increase with managers' opportunities to consume
 private benefits, but decrease with the cost of monitoring.
 As authors indicate, one of the motivations for this study is the context of analysis, the
 Spanish stock market. This implies that agency conflicts are different from those of An-
 glo-Saxon markets. From my point of view, although authors are taking this fact into ac-
 count when explaining results, they are not considering agency conflicts that may arise
 in a context of high ownership concentration when establishing hypothesis to be test.
 Much of their theory is built on research on dispersed ownership structures. In addi-
 tion to the characteristic concentrated ownership, the ownership arrangement of most
 Spanish corporations is further complicated by pyramidal and cross-holding structures
 (Fernández-Rodríguez, Gómez-Ansón and Cuervo-García, 2004; Sacristán-Navarro and
 Gómez-Ansón, 2007). These ownership arrangements allow controlling owners to com-
 mit low equity investment while maintaining tight control of the firm, creating a separa-
 tion in control (voting rights) and ownership (cash flow rights). One consequence of the
 divergence between voting and cash flow rights is that the controlling owner becomes
 entrenched with high levels of control, while the low equity ownership level provides only
 a low degree of alignment between the controlling owner and minority shareholders. In
 my opinion, controlling owner entrenchment as an agency cost of the separation of cash
 flow rights from voting rights should play a key role in the theoretical models on corpo-
 rate governance within a context of high ownership concentration.
 Regarding the advisory board role, in my view there are some aspects that could nuance
 arguments leading to the complexity hypothesis development. For example, authors do
 not take into consideration the relevant role that executive directors play for the advisory
 board function, due to their specific knowledge and expertise about the business (Car-
 penter and Westphal, 2001; Raheja, 2005). Recommendations to recruiting an effective
 board of directors have been focused mainly on director independence at the expense of
 other skills and qualifications. However, the financial crisis has shown that the tremen-
 dous complexity of the businesses and risks facing financial institutions warranted more
 industry expertise and insider knowledge in their boards. While independence and ex-
 pertise are not always mutually exclusive, independence thresholds do preclude the can-
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 didacy of insiders with extensive day-to-day knowledge of the company and tend to also
 preclude individuals who, in conjunction with their development of industry expertise,
 have naturally developed relationships and affiliations in the sector (Lipton, Rosenblum
 and Cain, 2011).
 In the discussion of separating the titles of the CEO and chairperson, authors have ig-
 nored agency cost of controlling the behaviour of a non-CEO chairperson (Brickley, Coles
 and Jarrell, 1997). Moreover, the CEO has expertise and specialized knowledge about the
 business valuable to the chairperson's job in his/her advisory board role. Then, separat-
 ing the CEO and the chairperson titles necessitates the costly and generally incomplete
 transfer of critical information between the CEO and the chairperson. As Adams and
 Ferreira (2007) suggest, if the CEO is also the chairperson of the board he/she will make
 his/her knowledge available to directors, allowing them to play their advisory role more
 effectively. According to these ideas, leadership structure is not only influencing needs
 for control by the board, as authors have considered, but also needs for advice (Brickley
 et al. 1997; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Both monitoring and advising by the board are
 more effective when the board is better informed. Since many independent board mem-
 bers have full-time jobs in other corporations, they rely on the CEO to provide them with
 relevant firm-specific information. The better the information the CEO provides the bet-
 ter are the board's advice and supervision. However, the CEO faces a trade-off in sharing
 information. On the one hand, the board will give better advice if the CEO shares his in-
 formation. On the other hand, information revealed by the CEO helps the board to deter-
 mine the range of options available to the firm. The more precise the board's information
 about these options the greater the risk to the CEO that the board will interfere in deci-
 sion making. Consistent with the quote above, the two roles of the board may conflict. In
 keeping with this idea, Adams and Ferreira (2007) show that in selecting their boards
 shareholders may choose to play off one role against the other. Specifically, to encourage
 the CEO to share information, shareholders may optimally elect a less independent or
 friendlier board that does not monitor the CEO too intensively.
 Finally, in addition to explanatory variables, authors have included control variables in
 all estimated models to avoid any bias in the results. They have included dummy vari-
 ables to monitor for industry level factors, such as economies of scale and competitive
 intensity that may account for variation in board size and board independence across
 industries. The rationale for industry fixed effects is that they control for the underly-
 ing economic environment that might jointly determine board size and independence.
 Firms in the same industry face similar production technologies and market conditions,
 the very things that give raise to the endogeneity problem in the first place. Moreover,
 authors control for time effects to take into account macroeconomic matters. However, in
 the light shed by previous literature, it is also important to control for business economic
 results or for market valuation when estimating board size and board independence
 determinants. It significance in previous studies shows that boards adapt their structure
 depending on those variables in the lag period. For example, Boone et al. (2007) show
 that firms respond to poor operating performance by increasing the proportion of outsid-
 ers on the board.
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 3. COMMENTS ON THE RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS
 The results evidence the importance of taking into account the problem of endogeneity
 arising in studies of corporate governance. Findings without Controlling for endogene-
 ity (FGLS) show that most of the relationships are significant, in contrast with results
 considering the endogeneity of governance variables (GMM). Therefore, readers should
 be cautious when interpreting results of tables 7 and 9 of the paper. A summarize of
 hypothesis and results can be observed in table 1 of this discussion.
 TABLE 1
 Summarize of hypotheses and results
 Hvnnfhr^ Board Board Variables Board size Board independence
 nypomeses Hvnnfhr^ §jze ¡ndependence (Proxies) Expected FGLS GMM Expected FGLS GMM
 ownership + - NS - NS NS
 r . - Ownership uontroi r + - concentration
 Debt + NS NS
 Firm size + + + + + +
 Complexity + + Diversification + + - + + NS
 Note: + indicates a positive influence of the proxy variable on the independent variable.
 - indicates a negative influence of the proxy variable on the independent variable.
 ? i dicates a  unknown expected influence of the proxy variable on the independent variable.
 NS indicates a non significant influence of the proxy variable on the independent variable.
 In my opinion, reliable conclusions can only be established by taking into account the en-
 dogenous nature of the variables under consideration. In this sense, results controlling
 for problems of endogeneity (GMM) indicate that significant variables affecting board size
 are only ownership concentration, firm size and level of diversification. With respect to
 ownership concentration, the relationship with board size is negative, contrary as it was
 expected according to the control hypothesis. Regarding firm size, the relationship with
 board size is positive, consistent with the complexity hypothesis. However, the influence
 of diversification on board size is negative, contrary to the prediction of the complexity
 hypothesis. Likewise, significant variables affecting board independence are ownership
 concentration, the use of debt and firm age. With respect to Ownership concentration and
 debt, the relationships with independence are negative, consistently with the hypothesis
 of control. On a whole, these results suggest caution in interpreting empirical evidence
 that purports to draw causal links between board variables and firm characteristics
 when board variables are treated as exogenous. They also imply that a «one size fits all»
 approach to board size and composition is misguided, since a large part of the consider-
 able variation in board size and composition is explained by variables such as firm size
 and ownership concentration, suggesting an underlying economic logic at work in deter-
 mining board structure.
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 With respect to the negative relationship between ownership concentration and the pro-
 portion of independent directors, authors conclude that, as ownership concentration is
 another control mechanism, it has less need for the board to act in a supervisory capac-
 ity, so fewer independents are required. This conclusion could be nuance by arguments
 of Kim, Kitsabunnarat-Chatjuthamard and Nofsinger (2007) pointing out that within a
 given country, if investors become large shareholders in part so as to expropriate wealth
 from minority shareholders, then these large owners may use their control to appoint
 managers and directors that are aligned with them to facilitate the expropriation, thus
 explaining the negative relation between ownership concentration and board independ-
 ence. Without strong laws to help and to empower minority shareholders, countries with
 weak minority shareholders laws may have firms with concentrated ownership although
 independent boards might not arise. Minority shareholders need strong legal rights to
 positively affect board composition and appoint more independent directors to protect
 them for expropriation from large shareholders. Within a country, a large owner might
 use his power and influence to create independent boards for delegated monitoring and,
 alternatively, a large owner might use his power to appoint managers and directors
 aligned with him.
 In the last section, authors have divided the sample according to two variables that are
 intended to represent needs for advice and needs for board control. Authors have con-
 sidered that firms are «in more need of advice» if they are more complex according to
 firm size. Thus, smaller firms are considered to be «in less need of advice». They have
 also considered that firms are «in more need of control» if they have a more diffused
 ownership structure. Thus, firms with a high ownership concentration are considered
 to be «in less need of control». On the one hand, arguments leading to needs for advice
 are consistent with results of previous regressions, because firm size seems to be a good
 proxy for firm complexity and the reported relationship between firm size and board size
 is positive. On the other hand, however, potential conflict of interest among large block
 holders and minority shareholders could nuance the relationship that authors establish
 between lower concentration of ownership and higher needs for control by the board.
 Indeed, the influence of ownership concentration on board size is negative, contrary to as
 it was expected according to the hypothesis established by authors. As I have previously
 commented when referring to the hypotheses development, although authors state that
 within the Spanish context main agency problem is not between owners and managers
 but between large and minority shareholders, they do not take into account this matter
 when designing the empirical analysis. Moreover, by considering not only the quantitative
 dimension of the ownership concentration but also its qualitative dimension, it could be
 easier to establish a reliable conclusion on the relationship between ownership concen-
 tration and needs for control, because not all large shareholders have the same incentives
 to control managerial behaviour and/or to expropriate minority investors. In keeping with
 above comments, the negative relationship between board size and ownership concentra-
 tion could be closely related to the qualitative dimension of ownership structure (Lane,
 Astrachan, Keyt and McMillan, 2006).
 Authors also find that board independence is more related to needs of control than to
 needs of advice. In the view of this result they conclude that, although independents are
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 important for effectively performing the board's two functions, in the Spanish context
 they are basically intended to protect the interest of minority shareholders and, as a
 consequence, they are chosen as board members precisely because of their control capa-
 bilities and not because of their experience and advisory capacity. This conclusion could
 be nuance by arguments suggesting that in some concentrated ownership structures
 control by independent directors could be non optimum (Lane et al., 2006).
 As a final comment on this paper, I would like to emphasize that, despite the tremendous
 growth in research on corporate governance and boards of directors within the fields
 of finance, management and organization, there are various issues that need further
 research. These issues are contingency perspectives and behavioural perspectives (Huse
 et al, 2011). Contingency studies should use fit-models showing that in some contexts
 certain board designs may be recommended, but in other contexts other designs may be
 more important. Contextual studies will also question universalistic effectiveness crite-
 ria. Values and objectives vary across contexts and actors and this also needs to be taken
 into account when designing and interpreting empirical studies. Moreover, behavioural
 insights from agency theory are very limited, and lessons from the behavioural theory
 of the firm may be the natural starting point for establishing better field research from
 a behavioural perspective on boards and governance. Future extensions of this paper
 could be focus on this last trend, although the availability of data often creates limita-
 tions in terms of research questions.
 To finish this discussion, I would like to sincerely congratulate the authors for their hard
 and rigorous work on a topic that is of current interest for both academicians and prac-
 titioners, as well as for regulatory bodies. This is an interesting study, both theoretically
 and empirically. I really appreciate the hard work authors have put into the paper and
 I am delighted to read their excellent work within Revista Española de Financiación y
 Contabilidad-Spanish Journal of Finance and Accounting. The paper invites readers to
 challenge and develop our understanding of boards and governance. To my own knowl-
 edge, this is the first study addressing the research question of which are the determi-
 nants of the structure of board of directors within the Spanish context by taking into
 account two main board roles (monitoring and advising), considering the endogeneity
 problem arising in corporate governance research and reaching to an interesting set of
 conclusions.
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